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Abstract. There is no consensus on the properties of voting power indices when there
are a large number of voters in a weighted voting body. On the one hand, in some real-world
cases that have been studied the power indices have been found to be nearly proportional
to the weights (eg the EUCM, US Electoral College). This is true for both the Penrose-
Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices. It has been suggested that this is a manifestation
of a conjecture by Penrose (known subsequently as the Penrose limit theorem, that has
been shown to hold under certain conditions). On the other hand, we have the older
literature from cooperative game theory, due to Shapley and his collaborators, showing
that, where there are a finite number of voters whose weights remain constant in relative
terms, and where the quota remains constant in relative terms, while the total number of
voters increases without limit - so called oceanic games - the powers of the voters with finite
weight tend to limiting values that are, in general, not proportional to the weights. These
results, too, are supported by empirical studies of large voting bodies (eg. the IMF/WB
boards, corporate shareholder control). This paper proposes a restatement of the Penrose
Limit theorem and shows that, for both the power indices, convergence occurs in general,
in the limit as the Laakso-Taagepera index of political fragmentation increases. This new
version reconciles the different theoretical and empirical results that have been found for
large voting bodies.
∗An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the Public Choice Society meeting, March 2010,
Monterey California, and seminars in Warwick and Moscow Universities. Thanks for comments to Fuad
Aleskerov, Steve Brams, Bernard Grofman, Valery Kalyagin, Marc Kilgour, Nicholas Miller, Itai Sened.
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Introduction: The weighted voting effect and its asymptotic
behaviour
The weighted voting effect is the fact that, in a weighted voting body - one in which differ-
ent voters are assigned different numbers of votes as a means of institutionalising differences
in voting power that may be required under its constitution - the resulting differences in
voting power are, in general, not proportional to the differences in numbers of votes. This
is well known among social choice theorists but otherwise not widely understood, although
it is a relatively common occurrence since there are many weighted voting bodies: for ex-
ample the US presidential electoral college in which each state casts all its votes en bloc
under the winner-take-all system, corporate shareholder voting, many intergovernmental
bodies such as the European Union Council of Ministers, the IMF and World Bank, and
so on.
The weighted voting effect can be seen very easily in a simple example. Suppose there
are three voters, with weights 49, 49 and 2 percent of the votes respectively and the de-
cision rule is a simple majority - a decision taken by vote requires 51 votes. It is obvious
that the voter with 2 votes has the same influence as one with 49. Any voting outcome
has to have at least two members to achieve the majority quota of 51, and any two will do
equally. If we measure voting power of any voter as his ability to swing a decision - that
is to change a losing vote by the other two into one that is winning by casting his vote -
then each voter can be said to have one third of the total voting power. Thus there is a
big difference between weight shares and power shares. Voters 1 and 2 have 49% of the
voting weight but only 33.33% of the power, while voter 3 has 2% of the weight and also
33.33% of the power. The weighted voting effect depends on all the weights and also the
majority quota. If the quota is increased to 52, then only voters 1 and 2 are now powerful,
and voter 3 has no influence; he cannot change an otherwise losing vote to winning with
his two votes. The voting powers are closer to the weights - in the ratios 50:49, 50:49, 0:2
- but they are still not proportional.
The question addressed in this paper is: what happens to the weighted voting effect
when the number of voters is large?
In general we represent a voting body which has n voters in the set N = {1, 2, ..., n},
by the notation
[q;w1, w2, · · · , wn] (1)
where the weight (number of votes) of the typical voter, i, is wi, and the voting rule is
that a decision is taken if the number of votes cast in favour of it is no less than the quota q.
This is the simplest case, of a decision rule with a single quota and a single set of
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weights. Some voting systems in the real world involve multiple majorities, for example
the current voting rule in the EU council of ministers (the system agreed as part of the Nice
Treaty) is a triple-majority rule: a decision requires a majority of the member countries,
possessing a majority of the weights and representing a majority of the population. Each
of these three voting rules has a different quota and different voting weights. For present
purposes we ignore this complication and concentrate on voting bodies which use a single
decision rule with a quota weights.
I will not give a full description of the theory of voting power indices here, since there
are many accounts, notably the seminal treatise by Felsenthal & Machover (1998). In this
paper I assume the reader is familiar with the so-called ’classical’ power indices due to
Penrose, Coleman and Banzhaf (which I shall refer to here as the Penrose-Banzhaf index)
and to Shapley and Shubik (the Shaply-Shubik index).
The literature contains two completely different and contradictory stories about what
happens to power indices when the number of voters is large. On the one hand, very early
on, in a series of Rand papers, written in the early 1960s, Shapley and his co-authors de-
veloped the limit theory, and the theory of ’oceanic games’, and showed that the weighted
voting effect can persist or even increase asymptotically (Shapiro & Shapley (1978); Mil-
nor & Shapley (1978); Dubey & Shapley (1979)). They assumed a voting body with two
types of voters: (1) a large number of voters (in the limit, an infinite number), each with
a small weight (in the limit infinitesimal) and also (2) a fixed finite number of voters with
fixed weights (which do not change asymptotically), and using a decision rule with a fixed
quota. Thus in the limit, as n increases, there becomes an ’ocean’ of small voters with
a number of ’islands’ representing the voters with finite weights. They specified this for-
mally as a sequence of voting games and analytically derived the limiting behaviour of the
power indices. They showed that, in general, in relative terms, the power indices of the
finite voters tend to limits different from the weights. Some support for these theoretical
results has come from applied studies of shareholder voting bodies by Leech (2002a). For
many public companies, such as those listed on the London Stock Exchange studied, the
shareholder voting body approximates the conditions of oceanic games quite well, having
a small number of large shareholders and many thousands of very small ones.
On the other hand, a more recent strand has emerged in the literature showing asymp-
totic proportionality between power indices and weights as n goes to infinity. See Lindner
& Machover (2004); Chang et al. (2006). This phenomenon, the Penrose Limit Theorem,
was originally identified in a conjecture by Penrose (1952). A proof has been given by
Lindner and Machover for certain special cases. It has been shown, however, not to be a
general rule (Lindner & Owen (2007)). It remains an open question how general are the
conditions under which it holds. This theoretical result has received empirical support from
applied studies of the European Union Council of Ministers (for example, S lomczynski &
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Zyczkowski (2007); Leech & Aziz (2010)) and the Electoral College (Miller (2010)).
In this paper I investigate this apparent contradiction and propose a general reformu-
lation of the limit theorem which can encompass both. I argue that the two strands of
the literature can be reconciled by defining the limiting behaviour in terms of the Laakso-
Taagepera index of voter fragmentation (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) rather than the num-
ber of voters.
1 Asymptotic behaviour of power indices and ‘oceanic games’
as models of large voting bodies
The asymptotic properties of the two classical voting power indices were developed in three
seminal papers by Shapiro & Shapley (1978), Milnor & Shapley (1978) and Dubey & Shap-
ley (1979).
These papers all assume a sequence of voting bodies in which the number of voters in-
creases without limit while the total voting weight remains finite. Specifically, they assume
that voters can be separated into two groups: major voters, of whom there are a finite
number, m, and minor voters, of whom there are a number, n, which is allowed to increase
without limit while their combined vote share remains finite. They derived the limits of
the indices, in the Shapley-Shubik case analytically, and in the Penrose-Banzhaf case by
showing that the voting body reduces to a simpler one in the limit.
The voting body, indexed by n in the sequence, can be written (modifying their notation
slightly for consistency with the rest of the paper):
[q;w1, w2, · · · , wm, a1, a2, · · · , an] (2)
such that,
n∑
j=1
aj = α.
The number of voters is m+ n where it is assumed that n→∞. The weights of the large
voters, w1, · · · , wm, the quota, q, and α are positive constants.
The sequence is such that,
max
j
aj → 0 as n→∞.
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1.1 The Shapley-Shubik index
The first paper to study the Shapley-Shubik index (henceforth the SSI) in large voting
games was a 1960 Rand Corporation report by Shapley and Shapiro, later published in
Mathematics of Operations Research (Shapiro & Shapley, 1978).
Let let M = {1, 2, · · · ,m} represent the set of large voters, φi∞ be the limiting SSI for
large voter i ∈M as n→∞. Also let s = |S| and w(S) = ∑i∈S wi for any set of voters S.
The most important class of voting body is where w(M) < q < α, what Shapiro and
Shapley call the interior case, where the combined votes of the large voters are neither
winning nor blocking. Shapiro and Shapley proved the following:
Theorem 1 (Shapiro and Shapley): For the sequence of voting games defined above,
for each major voter, i ∈M , his SSI converges on the limit φi∞,
φi∞ =
∑
S⊆M\{i}
∫ (q−w(S))/α
(q−w(S∪{i}))/α
ts(1− t)m−s−1dt. (3)
Proof (Shapiro & Shapley, 1978)
This holds for a voting body with an arbitrary finite number of major voters. We can
obtain from it exact results for special cases. (It is of some interest that, in this case, the
limiting power index does not depend on the quota.)
Case 1: One major voter: It can be shown that for the case m = 1, expression (3) is
equal to,
φ1∞ =
w1
α
(4)
Illustrative examples of (4) for a range of values of w1 are presented in Table 1. In
this example the weights of all voters, major and minor, represented by the set N ,
sum to 1, w(N) = w1 + α = 1, so α = 1−w1, and weights and voting powers can be
directly compared.
Thus we find that relative powers and weights for the largest voter are very different
except when the weight is small, when they begin to approach proportionality. In
general there are no grounds for assuming any tendency towards power to weight
proportionality as the number of voters increases.
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Table 1: Shapley-Shubik index with one major voter
w1 φ1∞
0.4 0.6667
0.3 0.4286
0.2 0.25
0.1 0.1111
0.05 0.0526
0.01 0.0101
Case 2: Two major voters When m = 2, the limiting Shapley-Shubik indices can be
derived from expression (3) as:
φ1∞ =
w1
α
(1− w2
α
), φ2∞ =
w2
α
(1− w1
α
) (5)
Some illustrative examples of (5) are presented in Table 2. Again we assume the
weights sum to one so that weights and powers are fractions and can be directly
compared. Here, we have α = 1− w1 − w2.
Table 2: Shapley-Shubik index with two major voters
w1 w2 φ1∞ φ2∞
0.3 0.1 0.4167 0.0833
0.2 0.2 0.2222 0.2222
0.3 0.05 0.4260 0.0414
0.2 0.1 0.2449 0.1020
0.2 0.05 0.2489 0.0489
Thus, we find, in these special cases (which appear to be fairly unexceptional), that the
limiting values of the power indices are very different from the weights. There is no evi-
dence here of a general tendency towards asymptotic proportionality.
These results assume a sequence of voting games in which the number of voters increases
without limit, becoming asymptotically an ‘ocean’. In a subsequent paper Milnor and
Shapley proposed a game with a continuum of agents, an infinite number of players with
infinitesimal weights, and a finite number of players with finite weights, an ‘oceanic’ game,
and showed that expression (3) is obtained without the use of a sequence of games. (Milnor
& Shapley, 1978)
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1.2 The Penrose-Banzhaf index
The analysis of the Penrose-Banzhaf index (henceforth the PBI) case was presented by
Dubey & Shapley (1979). This case is rather easier analytically than the SSI case be-
cause the coalitional model underlying it is simpler. Each voter is assumed to vote ‘for’
or ‘against’ a proposed action with equal probability and independently. It follows that
in large games the votes of the minor players can be assumed to follow the law of large
numbers, and tend to a constant split with equal numbers voting on each side: α/2 ‘for’
and α/2 ‘against’. This means that the limiting values of the power indices can be found
simply by modifying the quota in a game with just the major players.
We therefore have:
Theorem 2 (Dubey and Shapley): For the sequence of voting games defined above,
the PBI of each of the major voters, i ∈M ,converges on the limit βi∞ which can be found
as the corresponding PBI in the modified voting body:
[q − α
2
;w1, w2, · · · , wm] (6)
Proof Dubey & Shapley (1979)
Table 3: Penrose-Banzhaf indices with two major voters
w1 w2 α q − α2 β1∞ β2∞
0.3 0.1 0.6 0.21 1.0 0.0
0.2 0.2 0.6 0.21 0.5 0.5
0.3 0.05 0.65 0.185 1.0 0.0
0.2 0.1 0.7 0.16 1.0 0.0
0.2 0.05 0.75 0.135 1.0 0.0
Table 3 shows the limiting values of the normalised PBI’s for the same voting bodies
as in Table 2, with a quota of q = 0.51. Table 4 shows some results for the case of 3 major
voters. It is clear that, in general, the asymptotic, as nl → ∞, PBI’s are far from being
proportional to the weights.
It is worth noting, incidentally, that, comparing Tables 2 and 3, it is clear from these
examples that, in general, the values of the PBI can be very different indeed from those of
the SSI. This finding is important and interesting not least because it shows the fallacy that
is often made by writers claiming that the two ‘classical’ power indices are very similar. It
should be assumed that, generally, in large voting bodies they could be very different.
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Table 4: Penrose-Banzhaf indices with three major voters
w1 w2 w3 β1∞ β2∞ β3∞
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2
0.3 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0
2 Empirical findings for shareholder voting power and com-
parison with theoretical results for ‘oceanic’ power indices
The theoretical results discussed in the previous section are derived for limiting cases.
Asymptotic results tell us nothing about the rate of convergence to the limit and therefore
these results can give us no guidance on large finite voting bodies in the real world. We
still have the question: how large does n have to be in order that the limiting theory can
be assumed to hold as a reasonable approximation? Voting bodies encountered in the real
world can never conform completely to the limiting case.
Earlier work (Leech (2002a)) on shareholder voting bodies for a sample of companies
listed on the London Stock Exchange provides some insight into this question. Typically
large companies in the UK have many thousands of shareholders, the great majority of
whom own only a very small stake. There are a few large shareholders whose holdings will
be powerful because of the weighted voting effect and who will thereby be in possession
of a high degree of control over the company. The number of voters, although strictly
finite, is large (tens or hundreds of thousands for the largest companies) and such voting
bodies might be thought of as approximating the conditions of an ‘oceanic’ game. But
because the number of voters is finite, we have been able to compute power indices for
these shareholder voting bodies by algorithms that do not rely on the same limit theorems
(Leech (2003)) and therefore we can check on the realism of the theoretical results.
Tables 5 and 6 give the results for two randomly selected companies, one with con-
centrated ownership, where there is at least one large shareholder, and one with dispersed
ownership, where the largest shareholder is relatively small. In each case, we show the
weights for the top six shareholders, as proportions, and the corresponding limiting PBI’s,
the indices for the finite game, the limiting SSI’s and the SSI’s for the finite game. In
each case the data is such that only the upper tail of the distribution of shareholdings is
observed: in the case of Conder Group the 18 largest shareholders are observed and in the
case of Aurora, it is the largest 38 shareholders. We assume (for the sake of convenience)
that the unobserved shareholdings are as large as possible, that they are all no bigger than
w18 in the former and w38 in the latter cases. Therefore the finite voting bodies are as-
sumed to have n = 78 and n = 176 voters respectively. In calculating the limiting oceanic
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voting power indices we assume m = 18 and m = 38 respectively for the PBI’s and m = 5
for the SSI’s.
There is a different pattern in the two cases. In the concentrated ownership case, Con-
der Group, the largest shareholding is 35%, the second-largest 12.5% and the third 7.9%.
In comparison with companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, this is a very concen-
trated ownership structure, with a very large shareholder. This concentration is reflected
in the value for the normalised PBI for shareholder 1, 0.9222, or a power index of over
92%. By contrast the PBI for shareholder 2 is only 0.0033, that is that a shareholder with
12.5% of the votes has only 0.3% of the voting power. The concentration of voting weight
tends to lead to a greater concentration of voting power. The limiting PBI’s, βi∞, are
very similar to the finite indices, suggesting that the asymptotic results are a reasonable
approximation to the real power indices.
The two versions of the SSI’s are also very close to each other, agreeing to two places
of decimals. However they are very different from the PBI’s.
What is notable is that both the PBI’s and the SSI’s are quite different from the weights.
So although this is a large voting body, we cannot infer from these results that power and
weight are proportional.
Table 5: Shareholder power indices: Conder Group - concentrated ownership
i = 1 2 3 4 5 6
wi 0.3526 0.1252 0.0790 0.0364 0.0297 0.0242
βi(n = 78) 0.9222 0.0033 0.0033 0.0032 0.0029 0.0023
βi∞(m = 18) 0.9912 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0004
φi(n = 78) 0.5052 0.0887 0.0643 0.0286 0.0232 0.0188
φi∞(m = 5) 0.5066 0.0879 0.0646 0.0287 0.0232 ——–
On the other hand, the findings for the company with relatively dispersed share own-
ership, Aurora in Table 6, are quite different. Here all the indices, with the exception of
the limiting PBI’s, βi∞, appear to be close to each other and the weights. This suggests
that it may be the dispersion of the weights rather than the number of voters that is the
important factor.
Other real-world examples in which measures of voting power are not proportional to
weights for at least some voters include the IMF and World Bank, bodies for which n > 180
(Leech, 2002b). Another example might be a hypothetical world assembly where voting
weights are proportional to populations.
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Table 6: Shareholder power indices: Aurora - dispersed ownership
i = 1 2 3 4 5 6
wi 0.0293 0.0282 0.0225 0.0220 0.0174 0.0169
βi(n = 176) 0.0304 0.0291 0.0229 0.0224 0.0175 0.0170
βi∞(m = 38) 0.0742 0.0711 0.0556 0.0543 0.0425 0.0412
φi(n = 176) 0.0300 0.0288 0.0228 0.0223 0.0176 0.0171
φi∞(m = 5) 0.0301 0.0289 0.0230 0.0224 0.0177 ——–
3 The Penrose Limit Theorem and recent evidence support-
ing it
Recent literature, beginning with Lindner & Machover (2004), has examined the question
from the point of view of the Penrose limit theorem, which was a result stated by Penrose
(1952). He did not actually present it as a formal theorem and gave no proof; he merely
mentioned it in passing, in describing his Square Root Rule1, so perhaps it might more
accurately be described as a conjecture. We can state the theorem as follows (after Lindner
and Macover).
Theorem 3 (Penrose Limit Theorem): If the number of voters increases indefinitely
while existing voters always keep their old weights and the relative quota is pegged at half
the total weight, then, under suitable conditions,
βi
βj
→ wi
wj
for any pair of existing voters, i, j, where βi and βj are the normalised or non-normalised
Penrose-Banzhaf indices. Lindner and Machover also give a version of the theorem in terms
of the SSI.
Proof Lindner & Machover (2004)
1The Penrose square root rule is a rule for equalising a priori voting power in a federal voting body,
where there are two levels of voting. At the first, local stage, if voting is by majority rule with one-person-
one-vote, the voting power index of any voter is inversely proportional to the square root of the electorate.
Therefore the second, higher level should adopt a rule whereby the voting power of each delegate should
be proportional to the square root of his electorate.This is hard to implement in general. However, if the
conditions for the Penrose limit theorem hold, an approximation can be used whereby the voting weights
at the higher level are chosen proportional to the square roots of the electorates in the knowledge that they
will be proportional to the powers.
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Lindner and Machover show, by a counterexample, that the limit does not hold in
general, hence the need for the ‘under certain conditions’ qualification.(See also Lindner &
Owen (2007).) But they argue that such counter-examples are atypical.
Studies which find evidence of approximate proportionality in large voting bodies in-
clude the analysis of the Nice system of qualified majority voting currently used by the
Council of the European Union2 for which power and weight are close to being proportional
in the present 27-member EU. This is true not only for the PBI but also the SSI. Support
for the theorem has also come from a simulation study by Chang et al. (2006). Their
overall conclusion is “Both real-life and randomly generated Weighted Voting Games with
many voters provide much empirical evidence that the Penrose Limit Theorem holds in
most cases, as a general rule”.
Other empirical studies also appear to support the case. For example S lomczynski
& Zyczkowski (2007) have proposed a weighted majority voting rule for the EU Council
in which decisions are taken by a single supermajority with votes being assigned to each
country in proportion to the square root of its population, a variant of the Penrose Square
Root rule. The PBI’s are extremely close to proportionality. Leech & Aziz (2010) have
also studied the voting power properties of this proposed voting system - the ‘Jagiellonian
compromise’ - under hypothetical scenarios for an expanding union and found it to be
remarkably proportional also in much larger possible European unions. However this does
not in itself constitute evidence that this is due to n being large. (And it cannot be due
to the weights being population square roots.)
Other apparent empirical support comes from a recent study by Miller (2010) of the
US presidential Electoral College. See Figure 1. He finds power closely proportional to
weight in all states except the one with the largest weight, California, where it is slightly
greater. Again it is not clear that this is due to n being large (in this study, n = 51) or
something else. It is interesting to note that the departure from proportionality is with
the state with most electoral votes by a wide margin.
There are undoubtedly many more such examples. However, as we have seen above,
there are also many real-world examples that do not support this version of the Theorem.
However a careful reading of Penrose can give rise to a slightly different interpretation of his
conjecture. In the next section I discuss this question in detail and propose a restatement
of the Theorem which can reconcile the conflicting empirical observations.
2Actually a triple-majority rule with supermajorities
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Figure 1: Share of voting power by share of electoral votes(Miller, 2009)
4 Penrose’s approximation
The approximation that Penrose (1952) gives is based on the assumption of a probabilistic
voting model and an appeal to the central limit theorem to enable the use of the Gaussian
distribution. The accuracy of the approximation therefore depends crucially on whether
the conditions for the central limit theorem actually do hold in any particular case.
In the next subsection I will present and restate his argument, amplifying it for clarity
where necessary, following the same structure, and section numbering that he used in his
Appendix, beginning on p71. I will use his notation (supplementing it with my own where
necessary) with one change: he denoted the number of voters by u, whereas I will stick
with n, which seems more natural to me.
4.1 Penrose’s argument
Let us suppose a voting body3 has n voters with votes a1, a2, · · · , an. Penrose defines
S(a) =
∑
ai and S(a2) =
∑
a2i . He assumes a simple majority quota throughout. I will
use his section numbering.
3Penrose uses the term assembly - he was presumably thinking specifically, at the time he was writing,
of a then-planned United Nations General Assembly which he supposed would use weighted voting.
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(i) Penrose begins by showing that there is an equivalence between a general weighted
voting body and a hypothetical one in which there are a number of blocs each having
the same number of votes.
Let there be a number N of equal-sized blocs, 4 each with aN votes. Then, obviously,
NaN = S(a).
Equivalence is defined in terms of the probability distribution of the total votes of the
body, assuming probabilistic voting. The total number of votes cast ‘for’ an action
must be the same in the real and the hypothetical voting bodies.
Let each voter cast his votes ‘for’ the action under consideration with probability 12
independently of the other voters. Let the total number of ‘for’ votes be X. Then X
is a random variable with mean and variance,
µX =
S(a)
2
=
NaN
2
,
σ2X =
S(a2)
4
=
Na2N
4
.
We therefore have,
NaN = S(a)
Na2N = S(a
2)
and hence,
aN =
S(a2)
S(a)
and,
N =
S(a)2
S(a2)
. (7)
Note the distinction between the number of voters, n, and the equivalent number of
equal-sized blocs, N .
(ii) Penrose then defines the power of a single bloc of size aN in an assembly of N equally
sized blocs. It is as well to think of this as being a separate group of voters from
the one whose power we wish to measure: that is the complete voting body is of size
n+ 1 and the hypothetical equal voting body of size N + 1.
4This is Penrose’s exact notation.
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The absolute a priori voting power of this bloc (absolute PBI) is the probability
that it will be the swing voter. We know the mean and variance of the number of
‘for’ votes, X. In addition, if N is large enough (or equivalently n large enough and
the variance of the weights not too large) then X can be assumed to have a Gaussian
distribution by the central limit theorem. Now we can find the swing probability.
Penrose assume that the voter with aN votes is able to swing the decision if the ‘for’
votes just balance the ‘no’ votes; that is, X = µX .
We know the probability density function of the Gaussian distribution of X is
f(X) =
1√
2piσX
e
− 1
2
[
X−µX
σX
]2
and therefore,
f(
NaN
2
) =
1√
2piσX
=
1√
2pi
2√
NaN
=
1
aN
√
2
piN
.
Therefore, the absolute voting power of the bloc, PaN , is given by
PaN ≈ aNf(
NaN
2
).
That is,
PaN ≈
√
2
piN
.
(iii) Penrose then gives the approximate power of a bloc of size a1, Pa1 :
Pa1 ≈ a1f(
NaN
2
) ≈ a1
aN
PaN .
(iv) Therefore, the power of any bloc with a1 votes is, from (ii) and (iii),
Pa1 ≈
a1
aN
√
2
piN
.
This requires a1aN to be small as well as N large.
(v) Then, since aN =
S(a2)
S(a) , N =
S(a)2
S(a2)
, we can write
Pa1 ≈ a1
S(a)
S(a2)
√
S(a2)
S(a)
√
2
pi
= a1
√
2
piS(a2)
.
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(vi) Therefore, this shows that, provided the conditions for the approximation hold, if
countries are allocated votes in a world assembly according to the square roots of
their populations, so that S(a2) =
∑n
i=1 a
2
i is the total world population, voting
powers are proportional to weights. Penrose says that this approximation is accurate
for small countries and even for large countries up to 15 of the world’s population.
(vii) Penrose next shows that this square root rule has the property that it equalises
voting power among all individuals in all countries, since the power of a single vote
in a country with population a21 is
1
a1
√
2
pi , each person’s power of influencing a decision
in this 2-stage voting body is
1
a1
√
2
pi
Pa1 ≈
1
a1
√
2
pi
a1
√
2
piS(a2)
=
2
pi
√
S(a2)
.
This is the original statement of what is now known as the Penrose Square Root
Rule.
5 The Laakso-Taagepera index
Penrose’s parameter N defined in the last section is a numbers-equivalent. It is the hy-
pothetical number of voters who, having equal weights, would be equivalent, under prob-
abilistic voting, to the actual voters in the sense that the distribution of the total number
of votes they cast ‘for’ an action would have the same expectation and variance. Actually
it turns out that this N is identical to the Laakso-Taagepera index (Laakso & Taagepera,
1979) of party fragmentation (hanceforth the L-T index), as we now show.
Definition: The Laakso-Taagepera index. If the weights of the members of a
voting body are w1, w2, ..., wn then the number L defined by
L =
1∑( wiP
wi
)2 = (∑wi)2∑w2i . (8)
is the Laakso-Taagepara index.
Alternatively, if wi is a vote share, such that
∑
wi = 1, we have
L =
1∑
w2i
.
(Laakso & Taagepera, 1979)
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It is apparent that L is the same as Penrose’s N defined in equation (7) above because
S(a) ≡∑wi and S(a2) ≡∑w2i .
The index L is widely used in political science to measure party fragmentation in
parliaments. It is a numbers-equivalent for the ‘effective number of parties’ taking into
account both the actual number of parties and their comparative sizes. In a weighted vot-
ing body its value depends on both the number of voters and the dispersion of the weights.5
Feld & Grofman (2007) show that the index can be written in terms of its mean and
variance, as:
L =
1
w¯ + ns2
where w¯ is the mean and s2 the variance of the weights, s2 = 1n
∑( wiP
wi
)2 − w¯2.
If the wis are vote shares, then w¯ = 1n and
L =
1
1
n + ns
2
.
The L-T index combines the number of voters with the dispersion of their weighted
votes.
6 The Penrose Limit Theorem restated
We can now give a restatement and proof of the theorem. We do not restrict the analysis
to simple-majority voting rules.
6.1 The Banzhaf index
Theorem 4 (Penrose Limit Theorem Restated) Consider a sequence of voting bodies
with n voters,
[q;w1, w2, · · · , wn],
where
∑
wi is constant. The quota q is not restricted to half the total weight. Let the
Absolute PBI of a voter a, having wa votes, be β′a and the L-T index be L. Then, for any
two voters, a, b, with constant finite weights,
lim
L→∞
β′a
β′b
=
wa
wb
(9)
5It is related to, and mathematically formally the same as, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of industrial
concentration used in industrial organisation economics and anti-trust policy.
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Proof
Assume each voter casts his votes ‘for’ or ‘against’ with equal probability, independently
of the others. Let the number of votes ‘for’ cast by voter i be ui, a dichotomous random
variable equal to 0 or wi with equal probability. Then, E(ui) = wi2 , var(ui) =
w2i
4 . Let the
total number of votes cast ‘for’ be y =
∑n
i=1 ui.
Now we make use of the Lindeberg-Feller theorem to determine the asymptotic be-
haviour of y.
The Lindeberg-Feller theorem (see Feller (1971)) states that, if a sequence of in-
dependent random variables x1, x2, · · · , xn with E(xi) = 0 and E(x2i ) = σ2i < ∞ for all i
such that,
σ2j∑n
i=1 σ
2
i
< , (10)
for all j, and some  > 0, then,
lim
n→∞P
b < ∑ni=1 xi√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i
< c
 = Φ(c)− Φ(b) (11)
for constants b, c, where Φ(x) is the standard Gaussian cdf.
Let us define xi = ui− wi2 . (ui was defined above.) Then xi has mean zero and variance
σ2i =
w2i
4 . (Also, note that y =
∑
ui =
∑
xi +
P
wi
2 .)
Therefore condition (10) requires that
w2j∑n
i=1w
2
i
→ 0
as n→∞, for all j, which is obviously not true in general.
However, we can find another condition in terms of the equivalent voting body with
equal weights that satisfies the analogous version of (10).
The total ‘for’ votes, y has a distribution with expectation and variance
E(y) =
LwL
2
=
∑n
i=1wi
2
, V (y) =
Lw2L
4
=
∑n
i=1w
2
i
4
.
Then, let us redefine xi in terms of equivalently distributed random variables with con-
stant variance.
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Write
xi = vi − wL2 ,
where i= 1, 2, ..., L and the random variables vi all have the same dichotomous dis-
tribution: vi = 0 with probability 1/2, or vi = wL with probability 1/2. So, E(vi) =
wL
2 , V (vi) =
w2L
4 . Also y =
∑L
i=1 vi.
Therefore,
E(xi) = 0, V (xi) =
w2L
4
, i = 1, 2, ..., L.
Then,
β′a = Pr [q − wa < y ≤ q] = Pr
[
q − LwL
2
− wa <
L∑
1=1
xi ≤ q − LwL2
]
.
Letting c = q − LwL2 = q −
Pn
i=1 wi
2 , this can be written as,
β′a = Pr
[
c− wa <
L∑
1=1
xi ≤ c
]
. (12)
In this case, we have that σ2i = V (xi) =
w2L
4 for all i = 1, 2, ..., L. Therefore, condition
(10) becomes now (replacing n by L etc):
w2L∑L
i=1w
2
L
=
w2L
Lw2L
=
1
L
→ 0 (13)
as L→∞, which is always satisfied.
Therefore, for large L, by the Lindeberg-Feller theorem,
β′a = Pr
[
c− wa <
L∑
1=1
xi ≤ c
]
→ Φ(c)− Φ(c− wa).
The first order Taylor approximation of Φ(c− wa) is
Φ(c− wa) = Φ(c)− waφ(c).
Hence,
β′a → waφ(c) as L→∞.
Therefore, for two voters, a and b, with constant finite weights,
β′a
β′b
→ wa
wb
as L→∞.
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6.2 The Shapley-Shubik index
The same property is possessed also by the SSI. We now state and prove this in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 (Limiting behavior of the SSI)
For the sequence of voting bodies defined in Theorem 4 above, and L the L-T index,
let the SSI for voters a, b be φa, φb. Then,
lim
L→∞
φa
φb
=
wa
wb
.
Proof
The proof uses a generalisation of that of Theorem 4 together with the approach of
(Owen, 1972).
The SSI for voter a (where we assume a /∈ N) is defined as,
φa =
∑
T∈S
t!(n− t)!
n!
, (14)
where S, T ⊆ N and S = {T ⊂ N |q − wa <
∑
i∈T wi ≤ q}. S is the set of swings for voter
a and T ∈ S is a particular swing.
The term inside the summation in (14) is a beta function, and so,
t!(n− t)!
n!
=
∫ 1
0
pt(1− p)n−tdp,
and therefore, substituting,
φa =
∑
T∈S
∫ 1
0
pt(1− p)n−tdp =
∫ 1
0
[∑
T∈S
pt(1− p)n−t
]
dp. (15)
Assume voter i votes ‘for’ with probability p, and ‘against’ with probability 1−p. Then
we can interpret the term inside the square brackets in (15) as the probability of a swing.
The number of votes ‘for’ cast by i are ui, a random variable with expectation wip and
variance w2i p(1 − p). Therefore the total votes ‘for’ cast by all voters is y =
∑n
i=1 ui. We
can redefine the set of swings S in terms of the values of y: S = {y|q − wa < y ≤ q}.
We can now equate the two expressions for the probability of a swing,
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∑
T∈S
pt(1− p)n−t = Pr [q − wa < y ≤ q] (16)
Now let xi = vi − pwL, where vi is a random variable taking the values 0 and wL with
probabilities p and 1−p. Then, E(xi) = 0, V ar(xi) = w2i p(1−p) and y =
∑L
i=1 xi−pLwL.
We can rewrite the RHS of (16) as
Pr [q − wa < y ≤ q] = Pr
[
c(p)− wa <
L∑
i=1
xi ≤ c(p)
]
(17)
where c(p) = q + pwL).
The condition for the Lindeberg-Feller theorem holds because σ2j = w
2
Lp(1 − p),∀j =
1, ..., L, and so
σ2jPL
i=1 σ
2
i
= 1L →∞ as L→∞. Therefore (17) becomes, in the limit,
lim
L→∞
Pr
[
c(p)− wa <
L∑
i=1
xi ≤ c(p)
]
= [Φ(c(p))− Φ(c(p)− wa)] = waφ(c(p)).
We therefore have the limiting SSI,
lim
L→∞
φa = wa
∫ 1
0
φ(c(p))dp,
and
φa
φb
→ wa
wb
.
6.3 Approximation
Theorem 4 has been stated and proved in terms of the limiting power index of voter a /∈ N
and the L-T index for the weights of voters N = {1, 2, ..., n}. This is the same approach
as used by Penrose who ignored complications arising when a ∈ N and essentially treated
a as an extra voter.
If we want to apply it to voter i ∈ N , then the restated theorem is in terms of the
limiting behavior of the L-T index for the set of voters not including i, N\{i}. It is of
interest to use the L-T index for the whole set of voters, N . We can find the relation as
an approximation. Consider the voting power index for voter number 1.
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Let LN and LN\{1} be the L-T indices for the two sets of voters. Let
LN =
(
∑n
i=1wi)
2∑n
i=1w
2
i
and
LN\{1} =
(
∑n
i=1wi − w1)2∑n
i=1w
2
i − w21
.
Therefore,
n∑
i=1
w2i =
(
∑n
i=1wi)
2
LN
= w21 +
(
∑n
i=1wi − w1)2
LN\{1}
,
and hence
LN =
(
∑n
i=1wi)
2LN\{i}
w21LN\{i} + (
∑n
i=1wi − w1)2.
Let w1Pn
i=1 wi
= k: the voting weight of voter number 1 remains a constant fraction of
the total weight. Then,
LN =
LN\{1}
k2LN\{1} + (1− k)2
.
Therefore, as LN\{1} →∞ then LN → 1k2 , and we can see that the theorem holds when
the L-T index is high provided that k is small.
Notice that the L-T index depends on both the number of voters and the variance of
the weights. It is not sufficient that the number of voters is large to ensure approximate
convergence of relative powers and weights. It depends also on what happens to the vari-
ance.
6.4 Application
There are two types of voters for whom this approximation does not hold.
1. Those with small weight in voting bodies with a few large voters. In this case we would
have that waPwi is small but L is also small. In this case the Gaussian approximation
is not good. An example of this case might be a small shareholder in a corporation
which has one (or a small number of) very large blockholders who effectively control
the company.
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2. Those with a relatively large weight. In this case L might be large enough but the
approximation involved in going from the limit in terms of cdfs to pdfs is poor because
waP
wi
is too large. An example might be the power index of a large shareholder in a
company with an otherwise very dispersed ownership structure.
7 Conclusion
I have examined the properties of the ‘classical’ voting power indices, those due to Penrose
and Banzhaf and to Shapley and Shubik, in large voting bodies. Applied studies of actual
voting bodies with large numbers of voters have found conflicting evidence of the relation-
ship between the voting weights and the power indices when the number of voters is large.
In some cases there is close to proportionality but in others they are far from proportional.
The Penrose limit theorem has been taken to suggest that in most cases there should be
proportionality.
This paper shows that it is false to assume a general tendency towards proportionality
as the number of voters increases. Instead it proposes a restatement of the Penrose limit
theorem in terms of the asymptotic behaviour of the Laakso-Taagapera index of fragmen-
tation, rather than the number of voters. It has that the result holds for both the power
indices considered, reconciling the apparently conflicting results obtained in different re-
search studies, both empirical and theoretical.
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